Abstract in most cases a programmer, is supposed to understand and take for granted the specification as presented by IThe desi'gn of security protocols is usually performed the expert. However, even the experts make serious mranually by pen and paper, by experts i'n security. Asmnistakes. Errors in protocol specifications can be classumptions are rarely specified explicitly. We present a sified into three main categories, errors with respect to new way to approach security specification: The protosyntax, assumptions, and security.
The The process of refining a textbook protocol by lhand Definition 13 T'he assumption function pre is defined into a specification containing all the assumptions, is by recuLrsion on the complexity of the rnessage content: both time consuming and error prone. Typically we (AA) pre(x, Agent(t)) BeIx(Agent(t)) Kr used from 2-4 days of hard and boring work to specify (AK) pre(x, isKey(k)) = Belx(isKey(k)) Jr the assumption version of the classical authentication (AN) pre(x, isNonce(n)) = Belx(isNonce(n)) ).r protocols, yet several errors occurred during the pro- F[key(s,x,y) by recursion on the complexity of the message content: Theorem 5 Any textbook protocol P, can be refined (PA) post(y, Agent(t)) = post(x, isKey(k)) = fully automated intto an assumption protocol P* with post(y, isNlonce(n)) = post(y, Time(r)) = E explicit generation of fresh timestamps and nonces. Belx(isNonce(n(z ,x))) andBeI,(Time (stamp(w ,X) ))
The next lemma shows that automated refinement is a homomorphism, and isproven using that composition occur as early as possible in the assumption proto-E is a imonoid and functional: Current(stamp(wT, x)). Then PX *(eq(3Q(P))).
U Consider the ind. step. Let PI = P' E3 P, where By theorem 5 we assure that the agent's nonces and lth(P/) 1: timestamps are explicitly constructed in the specification. If P is a textbook protocol then let RV dell(P E3 P) 13 X(P2) lemma 4 and 5 note the function constructed in the proof of theo-= (X(P') E3 X(P)) W1 X(P2) theoremn 2, VAS remiii 5, that is: X*(P) = *(eq(R(P))). Fortunately, the previous results about straightforward ( Ith(P) . The hasis is ohprove a couple of useful properties vious using (AR-1). Consider the induction step: Suppose that Ith(P) = k and that (A -role(x1) A ... A Lemma 7 Let PI and P2 be textbook protocols, then role(xn). By induction hypothesis P Ep X(P). Sup-(i) eq(R*(PI) E3 *(P2)) = eq(R*(Pi E3 P2)) pose witlhout loss of generality that P is extended with (ii) Both eq(P1) = P1 and eq(R*(P:)) = *(Pi) one clause at the end. Sinice we consider arbitrary extensions of the protocol, it is convenient to consider Lemma 8 If P is a textbook protocol, with Ith(P) = 1, the extension as a protocol addition: P El P', where then we have that P Ep X*(P).
Ith(P') 1. Since P' Kp J(P'), then P E3 P' EP (X(P) E3 R(P')) = R(P HI P') Theorem 6 If P is textbook, then PEp R*(P).
whiclh follows by the monotonicity of autoimated reProof:: By induction on Ith(P). Ind. basis is verified finement over the sub-protocol relation (lemma 3) and by X*(E) = *(eq(R(E))) = r. Consider the induction since Xf4 is a homomorphism (theorem 3). (BeItJ(isKey(key(a, U,8y)) A isKey(key(a,i1, y))) P' Ep R*(P'), and by lemnma 8, P" Ep R*(Pu). Theni ' F by lemmiia, 3, P' El P" Ep R*(P') 13 R*(P"). Now
Thus, whenever y receives a message encrypted with coimes the delicate part: Since eq is monotonie over Ep, y's public key, y should possess both its private and we have that eq(P' El P") Ep eq(3R*(P') El R*(PI)) public key and therefore be able to decrypt the message (1). By lemma 7 (i), eq(P' El P") = P' El P" (2), according to the axiom.
since P is a textbook protocol. By lemma 7 (ii) and (iii), eq(3R*(P/) E3 R*(PI)) = eq(Q*(P' E3 P")) (3),
Observation 1 All the previous results are mainand eq(R-*(P)) = R*(P) (4). Then the equations; tairned irn case the functions pre and post are extended w'th the equations for asymmrretric cryptography. P' EE] P" =(') eq(P' EE3 P'") Ep eq(R*(P') E3] R*(P )) =(2) eq(R*(P') El R*(P")) =(3) eq(-*(P/ El P")) 4 
